



THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 















By: Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. Schipani 
 
William Davidson Working Paper Number 532 
January 2003  
ADAPTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE 
 
 
Timothy L. Fort, Associate Professor of Business Ethics and Business Law, University 
of Michigan Business School; Area Director, Corporate Governance and Corporate 




Cindy A. Schipani, Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan Business 
School; Area Director, Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility, 






In previous work, we argued that there is a link between corporate governance and the 
reduction of violence.  In this manuscript, we further explore that link with a focus on 
how corporations can work toward the goal of reduction of violence in the societies in 
which they operate.  Here, we pose the question of how well suited various corporate 
governance regimes are to face these complexities, and how they can do so in ways that 
are consistent with their fundamental principles.  We focus on the corporate governance 
regimes of the United States, Germany and Japan.  A common denominator of the 
political entities addressed is a commitment to a political regime of democracy. 
 
Section I outlines our thesis that corporations are in a position to make contributions to 
peace in society because of shifting political balances of power.  It elaborates with the 
idea that our contemporary world has shifted from traditional balance of power 
conceptions in terms of the near universal embrace of parliamentary democracy requiring 
some reformulated description of the optimal relations among democracy, peace, and 
globalization.  This section establishes the general parameters of the argument that 
democracy and peace are linked and that there are serious charges that globalization 
works against democracy and thereby threatens the sustainability of peace.  Section II 
analyzes comparative models of corporate governance and considers the extent to which 
contemporary corporate governance models look to peace and workplace security as aims 
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ADAPTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE
+ 
Timothy L. Fort
* & Cindy A. Schipani
** 
 In May 2002, as President Bush was preparing to embark on a trip to Germany in 
an attempt to convince European countries to back tougher action against Iraq, large 
protests sprung up in the city of Berlin.  The fear of unrest prompted the German 
government to call over 10,000 police, the largest contingent ever assembled, into the 
city.
1  A large composite protest group composed of 240 smaller organizations, 
composed of such diverse organizations as anarchists and environmentalists, which 
referred to itself as the Axis of Peace (in response to the labeling by President Bush of 
Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as the “Axis of Evil” in his 2002 State of the Union 
address) targeted corporations with American ties in order to express their disapproval 
of the current American foreign policy.
2  Police had earlier thwarted an attempted 
firebombing on a Wal-Mart in Bonn, and they feared further attacks against the retail 
giant as well as against McDonald’s and DaimlerChrysler.
3  
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    Of course, such protests are not limited to those groups expressing displeasure 
with American policy.  In January 2002, Argentinian protesters ransacked Spanish and 
American banks and a McDonald’s in Buenos Aires.  These violent acts arose from 
what had initially been a peaceful protest aimed at economic reform by the new and 
unstable Argentinian government in a financial system where most of the investment is 
obtained from foreign sources.
4     
The above examples point toward an increasing trend in current global politics:  
the targeting of local branches of international corporations, especially American ones, 
in order to express disapproval with the policies of the corporation’s principal place of 
business and/or the policies of the host country.  American corporations, such as Wal-
Mart, McDonald’s, Nike, and Coca-Cola are prime targets because of their size, certain 
business practices, and the way that these companies symbolize the capitalist free 
market to the rest of the world.  The problem has become so troublesome and 
widespread that before the 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, a 
McDonald’s in that city shut down for the duration of the event and removed all 
identifying signs in an attempt to escape now routine protester outbursts.
5  
These increasing acts of violence toward multinational corporations have 
important consequences for the way these companies will need to structure their 
approach to international business.  It has thus become apparent that companies need to  
assure that their international business relationships are profitable on both sides.  This 
has become more important in this era of increasingly destabilized and fluid 
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international relationships, where the perceived dominance of one country leaves its 
companies that conduct international business subject to violent reprisals.  Although the 
companies that are likely to be targeted are often the largest and most visible, they are 
also perceived as being the most uncaring about the conditions that they create in their 
host country.  This has been evidenced by the ongoing debate over “sweat shop” labor 
that has resulted in protests against Nike both in the U.S. and abroad.  Therefore, it 
becomes vital for these companies to strive to foster peaceful relations in the countries 
in which they conduct business, and to use their influence that has often worked against 
them in international public opinion in a positive way to attempt to create a peaceful 
environment in which to conduct beneficial business relations. 
Relatedly, violence is not limited to the international front.  The United States 
has one of the highest rates of workplace violence in the world, with over 2 million 
instances reported.
6  In 2000, 11% of the 5,914 fatal work injuries experienced in the 
United States were due to some form of violence.
7  The increasing pressure of a global 
recession that has ignited new rounds of workplace violence is not only occurring in the 
United States, though.  In Japan, the sagging economy has led to rapidly increasing 
instances of “bullying” of white-collar workers, as the idea of an individual remaining 
with one company for his entire working career and being able to count on that 
company is rapidly becoming one of the past.
8   
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These incidences take a toll on the workers themselves and on the countries’ 
economies.  In the United States alone, instances of workplace violence are estimated to 
cost American companies over $4 billion a year.
9  In Germany, the direct psychological 
effects of workplace violence are estimated to cost over $112,000 (U.S.) for every 
company with 1,000 workers.
10  The indirect costs are estimated to be around $58,000 
(U.S.).
11 
In previous work, we argued that a link exists between corporate governance and 
the reduction of violence.
12  In this article, we further explore that link focusing on how 
corporations can work toward the goal of reduction of violence in the societies in which 
they operate.
13  Here, we pose the question of how well suited various corporate 
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governance regimes are to face these complexities, and how they can cope in ways that 
are consistent with their fundamental principles.  We focus on the corporate governance 
regimes of the United States, Germany, and Japan.   A common denominator of the 
political entities addressed is a commitment to a political regime of democracy.  At 
least in the post World War II era and particularly in the post Cold War era, all of these 
countries are committed to democratic governments and principles. 
  This article is thus organized as follows.  Section I outlines our thesis that 
corporations are in a position to make contributions to peace in society because of 
shifting political balances of power.  Section II analyzes comparative models of 
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corporate governance and considers the extent to which contemporary corporate 
governance models consider peace as a goal they should achieve.  Concluding remarks 
follow in Section III. 
 
I.  The Role of Business and Sustainable Peace 
It can be difficult to understand why corporations are inevitably engaged in issues 
of building democracy and sustainable peace.  Economic imperatives and competitive 
pressures can seem to make consideration of such political and moral goals beyond the 
scope of corporate responsibility.  Historically, there may be some justification for this 
reticence, but it is important to see that the twenty-first century may not replicate the 
geopolitical conditions of the previous several centuries.  In large part, this may be due 
to the balances of power that exist among various institutions including nation-states 
and multinational corporations, and the relationship corporations have with 
governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  Thus, this section: (1) 
addresses the contemporary geopolitical set of conditions that add complexity to the 
balances of power; (2) delineates the newly emerging alternate forms of democracies 
that may account for this reality; and (3) articulates various reasons why these 
alternatives are important to sustainable peace.  We then suggest how corporations 
might foster the stabilizing benefits of democracy, as well as how they might 
unwittingly undermine those benefits.  
A.  The Contemporary Context:  Balance of Power and the Nation-State 
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Particularly in developed countries, there can be an understandable tendency to 
think of corporations as private organizations with relatively autonomous authority 
through state chartering.  Under this conception, businesses may act to maximize profits 
provided they do not violate laws enforced by a typically viable government.  There is 
confidence in this model because, at least in first world countries, governments have the 
capability to enact and enforce regulations.  It is not so clear, however, whether 
governments of developing countries have the same power vis-à-vis corporations, 
particularly when considering the transcendence of multinational corporations beyond 
geographical borders.  The comfortable and traditional characterization of corporations as 
profit maximizers within the confines of the law may not be sufficient in today’s world. 
A key reason for the concern is the increasing complexity of the world in terms of 
the number of nation-states that now exist, the proliferation of NGOs, the power of 
multinational corporations, and perhaps most profoundly, the changing nature of the 
nation-state.  In an ambitious book, constitutional law scholar, Philip Bobbitt, examines 
the changes in the nation-state throughout history.  Bobbitt argues that the construction of 
legal constitutions has historically resulted from the necessities of war.
14  Implicit in this 
argument is that basic legal frameworks rest on balances of power to assure competitive 
advantage and sustainable peace.  As creation of the law, corporations are thus inevitably 
affected by factors of war and peace. 
Bobbitt traces (primarily European) history to describe transitions from princely 
states to kingly states, territorial states, state-nations, and finally, to nation-states.
15  The 
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key determinant accounting for each transition was a need to organize society to 
effectively compete with military advances and challenges.  For example, Bobbitt notes 
that prior to Napolean, most armies were relatively small consisting of fewer than 25,000 
men.
16  Armies were professional and therefore expensive, so warfare was largely about 
avoiding their destruction.
17  Napolean, was an exception in his desire to create clashes in 
opposing countries to break morale and ultimately induce them to surrender extant 
economic resources.
18  The French Revolution, however, gave rise to popular 
involvement in politics and Napolean, by 1794, took advantage of popular passion to 
create massive armies of almost 1.2 million men which, although untrained, were able to 
overwhelm smaller, professional armies.
19 
Warfare required popular sacrifice, and therefore required a different kind of 
political apparatus as well as more detailed laws to describe the basis for government, 
                                                                                                                                                 
The princely state promised external security, the freedom from domination and 
interference by foreign powers.  The kingly state inherited this responsibility and 
added the promise of internal stability.  The territorial state added the promise of 
expanding material wealth, to which the state-nation further added the civil and 
political rights of popular sovereignty.  To all these responsibilities the nation-
state added the promise of providing economic security and public  
goods to its people.  The failure of the Soviet Union to live up to this expectation, 
as much as any other cause, contributed to its delegitimation in the eyes of its 
nation.  Very simply, the strategic innovations of the Long War will make it 
increasingly difficult for the nation-state to fulfill its responsibilities.  That will 
account for its delegitimation. The new constitutional order that will supercede 
the nation-state will be one that copes better with these new demands of 
legitimization, by redefining the fundamental compact on which the assumption 
of legitimate power is based. 
16 Id. at 162. 
17 Id. at 187. 
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taxation, and conscription.
20  Thus, while Napolean is known for his military 
characteristics of ambitious and strategic innovation, he is also famous for his ability  
to obligate the mass of persons to the French state.  Among this vast  
people various groups from the bourgeoisie were employed in the service 
of the state; for their members there were lower taxes extracted by France  
from her conquered neighbors; working men found in the state an  
employer of last resort – the army (whose mass employment would not  
have been possible under the strategic and tactical constraints of the  
armies of the territorial state); and for every class a new meritocracy arose  
that measured status according to services rendered to the State.
21   
 
According to Bobbitt’s thesis, this example is one of law relating to military strategy and 
military strategy to law, because they mutually reinforce the state’s capacity for 
warfare.
22   
In the twentieth century, this relationship manifested itself in the nation-state, 
which Bobbitt argues, drew its legitimacy (a core concept necessary to any state), from its 
ability to satisfy the welfare of the constituents it governed and from whom it demanded 
sacrifices.
23  Coming out of World War I, there were three contenders for the nation-state 
system that would best accomplish constituent welfare: fascism, communism, and 
parliamentary democracy.
24  Bobbitt views the era of 1914-1990 as “The Long War” 
fought to settle which of these alternatives best benefited the welfare of citizens with 
parliamentary democracy successively defeating fascism (in World War II) and 
communism (in the Cold War).
25  Yet, the conclusion of each “epochal war” also brings 
with it a new set of challenges.  Out of the Long War, Bobbitt argues that a new kind of 
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state is emerging – the market state – whose legitimacy is not based on providing welfare 
for its citizens (particularly in the form of welfare entitlements, pensions, etc.) but whose 
rasion d’etre is to provide opportunities for its citizens through market opportunities and 
education.
26  These opportunities allow individuals to participate and to compete 
effectively in a global economy.  This environment recognizes the proliferation of 
nongovernmental powers, which although undermining the traditional nation-state, insist 
on respect for human rights regardless of the nation-state’s historical stand.  It further 
recognizes the increasing power of multinational corporations that may provide economic 
opportunity regardless of the nation-state’s traditional economic regulations.
27 
Bobbitt describes three models that describe the way these market states are 
taking shape.  They are they U.S. model, the German model, and the Japanese model.  
More will be said about the specific governance regimes these models reflect.  If Bobbitt 
is correct, the question becomes whether there is a way for these market-state systems to 
evolve so that they may:  (1) confront violent threats to them collectively (as through 
challenges from terrorism or from non-democratic regimes) and (2) provide economic 
innovation, shaped through law, to make key border-crossing institutions, such as 
multinational corporations, instruments of sustainable peace. 
 
B.  The Parliamentary Models: Germany, Japan, and the U.S. 
In general, democracies operate according to the wishes of a body of citizens 
electing representatives to govern them.  In Spencer Weart’s historical analysis, a 
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democracy is defined first in terms of a republic.
28 A republic’s defining feature is that 
“political decisions [are] made by a body of citizens who have equal rights.”
29  Such 
decisions are those made in light of “public contestation” of choices with political 
officials, who are accountable to the citizens for their actions.
30  To have public 
contestations, there must be free political expression, rule of law, and toleration of 
politically dissenting minorities.
31  The exact implementation of these features can vary 
significantly.  Weart also differentiates between oligarchic republics and democratic 
republics.  An oligarchic republic features voting by only one-third of citizens whereas 
democratic republics feature voting by two-thirds of citizens.
32  Interestingly, oligarchic 
republics rarely make war on other oligarchic republics and, according to Weart’s 
analysis, democratic republics never make war on other democratic republics.
33   
The specific characteristics of equal rights, toleration of dissent, voting, and free 
expression suggest that there is a different character of political solidarity in a democracy 
than might exist in other kinds of political regimes.  Indeed, at the heart of Weart’s 
analysis of republicanism is the idea of political culture.
34   A republican political culture, 
                                                 
28 SPENCER R. WEART, NEVER AT WAR: WHY DEMOCRACIES WILL NOT FIGHT ONE 
ANOTHER 11 (1998). 
29 Weart, supra note 28, at 11. 
30 Id.  
31 Id.  Actually, this designation of democracy has been applied to situations where two-
thirds of men vote.  While there are historical reasons to accept and normative reasons to 
support this as good, it may be desirable to think more broadly of citizenship as 
democracies developed in the twentieth century with increased universality of suffrage.   
32 Weart, supra note 28, at 12. 
33 Id. at 14.  Weart provides a caveat that these republics must be “well-established.”  By 
this, he means that toleration of dissent has persisted for at least three years.  Id. at 21.  
He indicates that the differentiation feature between oligarchic and democratic republics 
is that oligarchic republics suppress a “crucial domestic enemy” whereas democracies are 
more embracing of them.  Id. at 18. 
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and particularly a democratic political culture not only embraces ideas of equal rights, 
public contestation, and toleration of political dissent, but it also values the political 
process and resolves disputes among citizens by negotiation and mutual accommodation 
rather than by coercion.
35 
Benjamin Barber builds upon similar notions when he argues that democracy 
requires the foundation of civil society.
36  This foundation is not built quickly as the 
evolution of democracy in Britain and the United States shows, but rather slowly; nearly 
three quarters of a millennium passed between Magna Carta to the Declaration of 
Independence.
37  Although, as Barber argues, civil society is not about voting and buying 
and selling, it is about an environment “where we talk with neighbors about a crossing 
guard, plan a benefit for our community school, discuss how our church or synagogue 
can shelter the homeless, or organize a summer softball league for our children.”
38  Civil 
society, therefore, provides a foundation for democracy because it trains people to 
organize themselves to solve public issues in a non-coercive way, on the basis of respect, 
persuasion, and negotiation -- the hallmarks of a republic political culture.  These 
activities are not about political organizing as much as they are about being part of a 
small group within which individuals are empowered to affect the norms of the 
community, or what is also known as a mediating institution.
39  These activities and 
institutions are “public” just as the government is public, but they “make no claim to 
                                                 
35 See id. (the designation of these features being particularly prevalent in democracies is 
the authors’ addition to Weart’s argument). 
36 BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS MCWORLD:  HOW GLOBALIZATION AND TRIBALISM 
ARE RESHAPING THE WORLD 276  (1995). 
37 See id. at 278. 
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exercise a monopoly on legitimate coercion.”
40  That is, mediating institutions do not 
seek merely their own self-advancement as a for-profit corporation might, but instead, 
they are concerned with issues concerning the common good.
 41     
There is a direct link to peace resulting from such societies because leaders who 
deal with equals at home by non-coercive negotiation and compromise and are likely to 
deal with other similarly-inclined leaders of other nations through negotiation and 
compromise.
42  This does not mean that democratic (or oligarchic republican) cultures are 
incapable of warfare; but rather that they do not engage in warfare with similar kinds of 
political cultures.
43  Thus, democratic societies can be defined by the particular features 
of public contestation, equal rights, free expression, negotiation, compromise, election of 
representatives and accountability of those representatives to voters.  Underlying those 
societies is civil society where people voluntarily engage in quests for public goods that 
define their mediating institutions, but which also reach beyond special interests to 
embrace the common good. 
This kind of political system has, according to Bobbitt, defeated fascism and 
communism in the epochal war he calls “The Long War” that lasted from 1914 to 1990.
44 
Yet, with the end of The Long War, the creation of market-states poses new kinds of 
variations for optimal organization.  What is particularly significant is how all three 
                                                                                                                                                 
39 See, PETER BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE (1977) (noting 
that in small, mediating structures, human beings find their public face). 
40 Barber, supra note 36, at 281. 
41 Id. 
42 Weart, supra note 28, at 16. 
43 Id. at 16-17 
44 Bobbitt, supra note 14, at 24. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 532 
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variations – the German, Japanese, and U.S. model – provide for a system where 
economic transactions of multinational corporations have a central role.   
As noted above, Bobbitt has coined the term “market-state” to describe a new 
kind of state that is emerging.  Bobbitt argues that market-states make the maximization 
of opportunities for citizens the basis of their legitimacy.
45  But each differs according to 
how it creates those opportunities.  In the United States, it means 
 
  providing infrastructure (including intangible infrastructure like education  
  and the means of enforcing agreements) and relying on private enterprise  
to maximize the abundance of consumer choice and minimize the costs to  
the consumer of exercising choice.  In Tokyo, by contrast, maximizing  
opportunity means protecting domestic industries so that future  
generations will have a full array of employment opportunities,  
subsidizing research and development so that future opportunities for  
innovation will be practicably exploitable, and restricting the import of  
capital so that the government remains in control of its capital allocation.   
In Berlin, maximizing opportunity means social and economic equality  
among citizens so that opportunities available to communities, workers  
and future generations are maximized rather than maximizing the short- 
term profits of shareholders.
46  
 
Bobbitt characterizes the differing models used by democracies as: (1) the 
Entrepreneurial Model; (2) the Mercantile Model; and (3) the Managerial Model.   
The “Entrepreneurial Model,” which Bobbitt uses to characterize the U.S. 
approach, but which is not used exclusively by the U.S., is a model that stresses 
autonomy, individual achievement and consumption that “citizens of these states ‘invent’ 
their citizenships, identifying themselves with those subgroups within the state with 
whom they share a consumption pattern.”
47  Labor relations in this model tend to be 
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confrontational and immigration is generally welcomed.
48   Thus, the Entrepreneurial 
Model is more libertarian, less socially cohesive, with protections of citizens coming 
more from media exposure of wrongdoing than from government.
49  This, however, 
exacerbates the problems of social cohesion that every market-state faces.   
This model also stresses guarantees for human rights, free press, and political 
dissent, which tend to support individualism.  The Entrepreneurial Model has proponents 
outside of the English-speaking world, including, for example, Thailand and Peru.
50   
In the “Mercantile Model,” which Bobbitt uses to characterize the Japanese 
approach, but which is not exclusively used by the Japanese, immigration is discouraged 
in favor of maintaining “cultural homogeneity,” and labor relations tend to be more 
familial.
51  This model also “retain[s] conscription for military service (though with force 
levels vastly reduced from those of the twentieth century), affirmative action for certain 
social groups, and varying degrees of state control of the media.”
52   The Mercantile 
Model provides that human rights are more communitarian rather than individualistic and 
that “harmony rather than division” and “respect and reverence are a truer expression of 
its cultural values.”
53  These states, therefore, “attempt to minimize the public expression 
of opposition.”
54 
Finally, Bobbitt’s third model, the “Managerial Model,” characterizes the German 
approach, although not exclusively German.  This model also retains conscription for 
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50 Id. at  675. 
51 Id. at 671. 
52 Id. at 670. 
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military service, affirmative action, and some control of the state media.
55  With regard to 
labor relations, the Managerial Model “is ambivalent: open to ‘guest workers’ but hostile 
to new citizens.”
56 
From the snapshots of these models, predictions can be made about some of the 
salient features of corporate governance systems these models would promote.  The 
Entrepreneurial Model would stress agility subject to free choices.  Thus, an 
underpinning legal infrastructure of this model would stress transparency, fluid labor 
movement, and a predominant emphasis on protecting investment capital.  Indeed, these 
are features of the U.S. model. Yet, the 2002 corporate scandals demonstrate that this 
model also runs great risks of insufficiently accomplishing its goals.  In 2002, the country 
found that corporate executives and boards could be opaque rather than transparent with 
devastating effects for investors as well as employees. 
  The Mercantile market-state typically has a strong central government that 
partners with business concerns in order to enhance national industries and subsidize 
crucial research and development while deemphasizing consumption.
57  Social cohesion 
is maintained by suppressing income disparities and subsidizing public housing and 
access to education with the important proviso, according to Bobbitt, that these benefits 
are available only for those who are eager to work.
58 Mercantile market-states, such as 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, have had impressive growth although 
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their efficiency and productivity levels are more in the range of Egypt, Greece, Syria, and 
Cameroon.
59  Thus, the Mercantile Model faces the challenges of  
 
    opening up domestic markets to foreign competition; reforming the  
banking sector to bring greater scrutiny to credit transactions; allowing   
access to cheaper credit for smaller firms that are usually restricted to  
relatively high priced domestic finance and letting the cost of capital to  
dominant firms rise…the Korean Model is characterized by the  
concentration of power in four great companies (Samsung, Hyndai,  
Lucky-Goldstar, and Daewoo)…In Japan, the largest six companies  
account for over half the total assets of all listed enterprises.  Furthermore,  
some three-quarters of all shares are mutually held between companies  
and their financial institutions.
60 
 
From this, it can be predicted that the Mercantile Model will encourage a 
corporate governance system that is less concerned with transparency and its concomitant 
fluidity and more focused on social cohesion.  In such a system, one would expect tight, 
opaque control of capital with an offsetting corporate culture stressing loyalty to a 
corporate community.  Indeed, these are features of this model.  Yet, the 1990s show that 
this model also brings with it significant limitations on creativity and growth, which can 
undermine the corporate goals.  Lifetime employment may not be achievable under this 
system and capital investment returns may be dampened. 
The Managerial market-state, according to Bobbitt, “consists of three basic 
elements: free and open markets within a regional trading framework, a government that 
provides a social safety net and manages a stringent monetary policy, and a socially 
cohesive society.”
61  Protections are provided for ownership of private property but such 
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ownership also must contribute to the public good.
62  Labor and management are required 
to share power on corporate boards.
63  This system creates the “stakeholder company,” 
that attempts to balance all the actors affected by a corporate action, although corporate 
ownership is typically closely held through a centralized commercial bank.
64  Bobbitt 
describes the goal of the Managerial Model as being that of social equality whereas the 
goal of the Mercantile Model of social stability.  Government intervention tends to be 
more aligned with labor in the Managerial Model as opposed to capital in the Mercantile 
Model.
65  Although cohesion is also as important for the Managerial Model as it is for the 
Mercantile Model, the states following the Managerial Model, according to Bobbitt, tend 
to pay productive workers well and provide generous welfare benefits for those who do 
not have a job.
66  Beyond Germany, practitioners of the Managerial Model include India, 
Turkey, and Egypt. 
67 
It follows that corporate governance regimes under a Managerial Model would 
encourage long-term goals of justice, consensually endorsed notions by the affected 
stakeholders.  This system would be fortified by equipping stakeholders, particularly 
employees, with power to influence decisions.   In fact, this is a hallmark of the 
Managerial Model.  Yet, this approach also limits creativity and, paradoxically, limits the 
influence of actors that could be affected because the number of actors is so large that  a 
delegation of responsibility is inevitable.  Thus, it is questionable whether this model can 
achieve its goals.  
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  Admittedly, there is not a “perfect” system -- any organizational and political 
theory will carry with it contradictory elements.  Yet, there are at least three reasons for 
why each model needs to be open to influences from one another as well as to those other 
models that attempt an overarching synthesis.   
First, each model is potentially a target of terrorism.  For example, Japan suffered 
from attacks via sarin gas and the U.S. suffered via the attacks of September 11, 2001.  If 
a sense of justice mitigates some of the passions that might trigger such an attack, then 
each system needs to consider how to mitigate its weaknesses.  This is not to argue that 
mitigating weaknesses will prevent terrorism or that the weaknesses caused terrorism.  It 
is hard to see, for instance, how the better enforcement of generally accepted accounting 
principles and Securities and Exchange regulations had anything to do with the horrific 
events of September 11.  Yet, improving the perception of the justness of capitalism and 
democracy may help moderate social frustration. 
  Second, each model contains concerns for its own constituents.  As Bobbitt 
argues,  
    each model must contend with its own sort of alienation:  the lowest paid  
workers in the United States are vastly worse off than high wage earners,  
while the unemployed in Europe can get by on welfare benefits alone but  
have little prospect of a job.  By contrast, the Mercantile Model maintains  
artificially high employment rates, at wages that reflect far less disparity  
between the highest and lowest paid.  The unavoidable cost is in  
productivity and efficiency, which sets the stage for a new kind of  
alienation, that of the young from the old.
68  
 
Finally, the framework implicit in this tri-partite delineation is that in order to 
prevent  the models from becoming too ideological and competitive, “it is to be hoped 
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that informal private networks that cross international lines – for example, the large 
multinational corporations developed in the twentieth century, or the extensive social 
networks developed by overseas Chinese in East Asia and the United States, or global 
nongovernmental organizations – will supply the links necessary to prevent the growing 
divergence of the three models of the market-state.”
69 
    The next question is how will this be accomplished.  Given the realities that the 
major governing paradigms are variations of democracy, it seems appropriate to examine 
what benefits democracy itself may offer and how corporations interact with democratic 
institutions. 
  C.  Benefits of Democracy 
Immanuel Kant thought that free peoples were inherently peaceful.
70  The historical 
record, however, is mixed; democracies can be as warlike as any other regime.
71   Yet, 
the fact remains that democratic countries do not fight each other.  Spencer Weart 
reviews historical data and establishes the claim that “well-established democracies 
have never made war on one another.”
72  Corroborating that claim, Babst studied wars 
fought since 1500 and found no wars (involving at least 50,000 troops or fought to 
cause territorial transfer, a change in government, or eradication of a state) had 
occurred between freely elected, independent governments.
73  Three reasons have been 
offered for why this is true.  
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First, democratic republics are more pluralistic than authoritarian regimes.
74  
The mediating institutions that proliferate in civil society cut across various social ties 
so that no one group’s anger can automatically lead  to belligerence.
75  The multiple ties 
any one person might feel toward a particular neighborhood, church, or political party 
create an internal check on political processes and make it more difficult for a central 
authority to claim the need to go to war to vindicate the interests of a particular group.
76 
Second, Weart writes that the theory “that republicans generally behave more 
peacefully toward other nations than do autocrats has been confirmed about as reliably 
as anything can be in statistical studies of human communities.”
77   In a democracy, a 
leader has little choice but to compromise and this leadership style tends to extend to 
those outside of one’s borders assuming that a preference for negotiation also exists on 
the other side.
78 
In order for Weart to make his argument about the benefits of democracy vis-à-vis 
peace, he creates a few basic definitions.  These definitions are helpful in beginning the 
process of transferring democratic principles over to a corporate context.  Weart argues 
that what makes a culture republican is equal rights among citizens and the toleration of 
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dissent.
79  Moreover, a culture does not become an established republic simply by a 
declaration; instead, to meet this classification, toleration of dissent must have persisted 
for at least three years.
80   
Thus, one way businesses might be able to contribute to peace is to support the 
establishment of democratic regimes wherever they do business.  This would require 
more than rhetoric, it would also require support of equal rights and tolerance of 
dissent.  Even if a corporation cannot nudge a political regime toward democracy, it can 
implement some of the practices which define a democracy in its own governance 
structure.  By doing so, it may well provide a model for democratic-like attributes that 




D.  The Role for the Corporation 
1.  The Paradox of Globalization and Democracy 
Benjamin Barber has argued that democracy is under attack from two very 
different sources.  One source is Jihad, which typically is thought in terms of Islamic 
extremism, but which Barber argues is a metaphor for all parochial groups reacting 
against globalization.
82  The other source is McWorld, which transcends traditional 
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borders and boundaries to link people together in a quest for consuming goods and 
achieving profitability.  As different as they are: 
Jihad and McWorld have this in common: they both make 
war on the sovereign nation-state and thus undermine the  
nation-state’s democratic institutions.  Each eschews civil  
society and belittles democratic citizenship, neither seeks  
alternative democratic institutions.  Their common thread  
is indifference to civil liberty.
83     
Barber argues that Jihad is committed to bloody politics of identity whereas 
McWorld is a bloodless pursuit of profitability.
84  Jihad reacts against the 
homogenization of culture by fighting global business and, as Barber makes clear, 
Jihad’s disdain is more with capitalism than it is with democracy.
85  McWorld has little 
argument with democratic institutions, but undermines the community ties necessary 
for individuals to understand their connection to the common good as opposed to a 
market where self-interest only is the necessary consideration.
86  Moreover,  the “twin 
assault on democratic citizenship from the fractious forces of Jihad and the spreading 
markets of McWorld in effect undercuts democratic institutions.”
87  The paradox is that 
corporations thrive on democratic virtues, but simultaneously undercut them.
88 
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In response to this paradox, Barber claims that one must rebuild civil society, 
including the traditional mediating institutions that bridge commonly made distinctions 
between public and private life.  Barber argues that we too often rely on a “two-celled” 
distinction between government versus private sector, but the middle ground of civil 
society is where we voluntarily come together to talk about what is necessary for the 
common good, be it the softball league, religious outreach, or neighborhood crossing 
guards.
89  Unlike governmental affairs, there is no coercion present – actions are 
voluntary – but unlike the private sector, there is concern for the common good.
90  It is 
in this realm, a realm Barber argues is populated by schools, churches, public interest 
groups, and other civic organizations, where citizenship is developed.
91  That space, 
however, has been squeezed, he argues, as corporations encroach on the space of civil 
society, as governments react to check the rise of corporate power, and as individuals 
begin to think of themselves as consumers rather than citizens.
92 
Barber’s analysis begs the question whether business is part of civil society.  
Barber suggests that the answer is no, noting that it may be unfair to ask a corporation 
to be committed to a vision of justice or democracy.
93  He argues, however, that 
businesses wade into political issues if only to create a middle class that can purchase 
their goods.  Businesses, he argues, are not designed to do what democratic polities do 
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– they are contractual rather than communitarian.
94  Yet, this account misses two 
important points. 
First, although markets may not be designed to create democratic polities, 
businesses draw people to work for them and invest in them, usually on a voluntary 
basis.  In doing so, they require people to work together for a common good, even if 
that good is simply profitability.  Profitability does not occur without significant 
practices of human cooperation within the organization.  Thus, businesses have the 
essential features Barber recognizes as emblematic of civil associations.   
Second, Barber follows Edmund Burke in arguing that human solidarity is formed 
by “resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies” rather than by contracts.
95  Yet, 
experimental psychological testing shows that association can be as arbitrary as 
whether a person has a dot on a nose or not.
96  In other words, human solidarity is not 
trapped by ethnic, religious, or genetic characteristics, but by any kind of affiliation, 
which could include people of differing ethnic origins working together.  The so-called 
private sector is not as private as one might think and within a business organization 
lies the potential, even the necessity, for working together for some common good.  
Thus, while Barber argues that the reinvigorization of a variety of mediating institutions 
in society would be worthwhile, we also emphasize that business institutions 
themselves possess resources for encouraging individuals to exercise voice in working 
for a common good.  The freedom to exercise voice entails a need to tolerate dissent; 
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otherwise only a narrow range of voices will be heard.  Within this exercise of voice 
and toleration of dissent lay the seeds for a business organization to foster a sense of 
democracy within its own borders.  This does not mean that businesses always or even 
frequently actualize this potential.  Yet, the potential is there, governance regimes are 
not far from supporting that actualization, and the steps necessary to actualize that 
potential lie in a commitment of business to peace.  That commitment not only breeds 
the stability on which business thrives, but also lays the groundwork for democratic 
republics to rise.  If multinational corporations in democratic countries do this, they 
may have provided a way to overcome challenges raised against them by appealing 
directly to the source of democratic liberal tradition.     
2.  The Huntington Thesis and the Spillover Effects of Corporate Behavior 
In his book, The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel Huntington, like Bobbitt, argues 
that the end of the Cold War has triggered a new balance of power among state actors.
97  
The Cold War, he argues, was able to submerge the ambitions for nationhood desired by 
a variety of ethnic groups but without the bi-polarity of Soviet-U.S. competition, so that 
these groups now have a freer reign to pursue goals of creating their own nation-states.
98  
These desires are not new, but the desire to bring all ethnic cousins under one state may 
spark terrible conflicts including, at the extreme, ethnic cleansing.
99  Huntington argues 
that the world will increasingly organize itself along these lines of identity rather than 
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nation-state status.
100  Thus, the world will tend to be grouped in terms of North 
American, South American, European, Russian, Muslim, Indian, African, Chinese, and 
Japanese peoples.
101  As the 1990s Balkans conflicts demonstrate, however, this means 
that not only might there be nation-states in conflict with each other, but because regions 
contain differing ethnic groups, there will also be potential for internal as well as external 
conflict.
102  Because Muslims in Egypt might identify with Muslims in Bosnia and 
Russians might identify with Slavs in Serbia, internal conflict can also exacerbate severe 
external tensions.
103 
The location of ethnic linkages around the world is nothing new.  The Balkans 
have long struggled with this problem and the presence of Germans outside of Nazi 
Germany was one of Hitler's pretexts for triggering World War II.  More benignly, China 
considers someone of Chinese heritage (such as an adopted child) as Chinese with an 
assumed identification with the Middle Kingdom
104 and the Czech Republic allows its 
president to be someone of Czech origin, even if not a "citizen."
105  Globalization, 
however, fosters additional immigration and immigration may further engender domestic 
conflicts in the countries to which the immigrants locate.  It may also spark conflicts 
between the immigrants’ home and new countries, if it is perceived either that the 
emigrees are not being treated well or, alternatively, that the emigrees are undermining 
the new country's identity. 
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Finally, this has implications for governments.  Bobbitt argues that governments 
that are able to successfully adapt to new global conditions are not only successful, but 
are duplicated by others.
106  As we have seen, he notes the prevalence of powerful 
parliamentary democracies practiced by the United States, Germany, and Japan as three 
distinguishable models.
107  If it is true that democracies are more prone to resolving 
disputes nonviolently, at least vis-à-vis other democracies, it may be important for 
corporations to engage in practices that contribute to democracy to foster a system that is 
more nonviolent than authoritarian alternatives, and to provide a model for countries to 
emulate.  This, in turn, may reinforce commitments to both democracy and sustainable 
peace.   
The “market-states” of the democratic, liberal tradition are in the position to 
engage in the creation of models that link the world both through democratic principles 
and through economic enterprise but are also in the position to re-create rivalries.  To 
avoid the problems Benjamin Barber finds endemic to capitalism and inimical to 
democracy, multinational corporations and the states that authorize their existence 
through requisite governance regimes, must consider how corporate behavior can 
enhance rather than undermine the democratic basis on which they are formed.   
To make this argument more concretely, we engage in an analysis of leading, 
extant corporate governance frameworks in the United States, Germany, and Japan.  
These countries account for over 50% of the world’s gross product, and if there is to be 
leadership in corporate governance along the lines we propose, it will be through these 
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countries.  The universe of the largest corporations of the work is primarily population by 
firms belonging to one of these three economies.
108  Moreover, the governance systems 
of Germany, Japan and the United States have substantial spillover effects beyond their 
respective borders.
109  Many countries in Europe, such as Austria, Belgium, Hungary, and 
to a lesser extent, France and Switzerland, and much of Northern Europe evolved their 
governance systems along Germanic, rather than Anglo-American lines.
110  The spillover 
effects are also evident in Asia, where Japanese firms have been the largest direct foreign 
investors during the past decade.
111  Variants of the Anglo-American system of 
governance are evident in countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand.
112  Given these significant spillover effects, it becomes important for these 
models to evolve in such a way so that they may confront violent threats to them 
collectively, and provide economic innovation to make them instruments of sustainable 
peace.  The following section considers the current regimes.  
 
II.  Implications for Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance has been defined as a top management process, that when 
operating correctly, should manage value creation and value transference among 
various corporate claimants in a way that ensures accountability toward those 
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claimants.
113  Claimants can be broadly defined to include all of those with a stake in 
corporate operations, including shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers, creditors 
and the local community.
114  This definition emphasizes both efficiency and fairness. 
There are different ways to approach issues of corporate governance.  In the 
United States, dating at least back 1919 in the famous case of Dodge v. Ford,
115 the 
approach has been a model that has focused primarily on the shareholder, the residual 
claimant of the corporate form.  In Dodge v. Ford, the court specifically stated that a 
“business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders.”
116  In other regimes, such as Germany and Japan, the interest of society 
and employees have historically, been the first focal point.  All three regimes have had 
both prosperous as well as trying times.   
This section examines these three models in the context of a search for 
incorporating the goal of peace into local corporate governance thinking.  Although all 
models, in some way or another, consider interests of various constituencies, including 
society at large, these models do not focus on the goal of peace itself as a general 
aspiration.  We propose that consideration of peace as a goal is not a far stretch from 
what the regimes are already doing, and has the potential for far-reaching effects not 
only for society at large, but also for business itself.  
A.  Corporation Governance Regimes of Competing Market-State Models 
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1.   The U.S. Model 
First and foremost, throughout U.S. history, corporate governance has focused on 
the rights of shareholders.  The concern in the United States has been fear that because 
of separation of ownership from control that exists there is the possibility that 
management will act in its own self-interest to the detriment of the firms’ owners.  As 
such, the law has imposed fiduciary duties on corporate officers and directors, such as 
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.
117  The fiduciary duties are said to run to the 
corporation and its shareholders.
118  These duties require corporate officers and 
directors to exercise the degree of care in the conduct of corporate affairs as the 
reasonably diligent person would in similar circumstances, as well as to act in good 
faith and in the “honest belief that the action taken is in the best interests of the 
corporation.”
119  They also require officers and directors to put corporate interests 
ahead of personal interests, in other words, to avoid conflicts of interest.
120  The 
emphasis on fiduciary duties and relationships indicate that shareholder protection is a 
paramount objective expressed in the legal realm of corporate governance.
 121 
The U.S. model is, however, multi-faceted.  According to the American Law 
Institute (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance, even if corporate profit is not 
enhanced, corporations may also take into account “ethical considerations that are 
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reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business.”
122  A 
corporation may attain this objective by “devot[ing] a reasonable amount of resources 
to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.”
123  Most 
states endorse this position, which retreats from the position of shareholder primacy to 
the exclusion of all other interests, by statutorily permitting corporations to take into 
account the interests of stakeholders, other than shareholders, when making corporate 
decisions.  The New York statute, for example, expressly provides that interests of 
other constituencies, including current employees, retired employees, customers, and 
suppliers can be considered when making corporate decision.
124  Connecticut even 
requires that the interests of other constituencies be taken into account in decision-
making.
125  Connecticut appears to be somewhat of an aberration though, because most 
states simply permit, rather than require these considerations. 
Yet, the stakeholder constituency statutes are not without controversy.  On their 
face, they appear to promote goals of corporate social responsibility, even if the goal of 
shareholder gain might not be served.  As such, they have come under fire.  Some 
commentators prefer a more direct anchor to shareholder interests.  Nicholas 
Wolfson,
126 Oliver Williamson,
127 James W. Walker, Jr.
128 and James D. Cox
129 have 
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expressed this view, criticizing, in particular, the ALI approach.  According to Wolfson, 
there is no empirical support for the ideas in the ALI model, and inclusion of these 
other objectives compromises efficiency and invites various tradeoffs.
130  Perhaps even 
more troubling is M.J. Pritchett, III’s argument that the ALI’s optional approach might 
give management a free reign to promote their own self-interests under the guise of 
promoting social responsibility.
131   
The debate surrounding the role of the shareholder in the United States indicates 
that the U.S. approach to corporate governance is an approach based in shareholder 
primacy, but with a fair amount of built-in flexibility.  That is, although shareholders 
still appear to be the most important constituent, the interests of other constituencies are 
significantly recognized. 
In furtherance of the goal of providing value to shareholders, corporate law in the 
United States puts a great deal of emphasis on removing any hint of bias on the part of 
corporate directors.  This has manifested itself in the increasing popularity of the 
“independent director.”   Independent directors hold mostly monitoring positions where 
they oversee actions of the CEO and other board members.   
Irrespective of the arguments surrounding the weight American corporate boards 
can place on stakeholder interests who are not shareholders, the U.S. shareholder 
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primacy model has created a corporate governance system which values transparency 
and disclosure.  These values of transparency and disclosure are evident in both the 
federal and state securities laws and federal insider trading rules.   
Federal and state securities laws are based on the premise that shareholders are 
entitled to full and fair disclosure regarding the nature of their investments.  To 
effectuate full and fair disclosure, the federal securities regime, regulated by the 
Securities Act of 1933
132 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
133 requires 
corporations to disclose all significant aspects of their business before they can issue 
securities to the public.  The Securities Act of 1933 mandates this disclosure by 
requiring any corporation wishing to sell its securities to the public to register its 
securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
134  As part of the registration 
process, the corporation must prepare a prospectus, which discloses to potential 
investors the material aspects of the corporation’s business.
135  Information disclosed in 
the prospectus includes not only the price of the securities to be sold but also detailed 
financial information about the corporation.
136  The corporation must also disclose 
information concerning its management and key shareholders.
137 After a corporation’s 
securities have been registered, the duty to disclose information continues on an annual 
basis
138 or in the event of a major change within the corporate structure.
139 If the 
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corporation decides not to sell its securities in a public offering, but instead in a private 
transaction, registration is not necessary, but in certain circumstances the corporation 
must still make similar disclosures to the purchasers of its securities.
140  To supplement 
the federal rules, each state has its own disclosure rules concerning the sale of a 
corporation’s securities within the boundaries of its state.      
  Strict penalties for noncompliance attempt to ensure American corporations take 
these disclosure and transparency rules seriously.  A corporation that issues securities 
under a registration statement containing omissions or material misstatements exposes its 
officers, directors, underwriters and certain experts to civil liability.
141  In addition, a 
corporation can be liable in the form of damages for any loss sustained by a purchaser of 
securities issued under a registration statement with omissions or material misstatements.  
In certain circumstances, a corporation may also be subject to criminal fines and 
penalties.   
  The ban on insider trading also highlights the importance American corporate 
governance regimes place on transparency and disclosure.  The purpose of insider trading 
rules is to prevent any person from selling securities based on material, nonpublic, 
confidential information.  Indeed, one of the policy rationales for regulating insider 
trading is that it is unfair to those who trade without access to the same information 
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available to insiders and others.
142  The classic case of insider trading arises when a 
corporate insider buys or sells shares of the corporation using confidential information 
obtained through the insider’s corporation position, and as a result, earns a profit.  
Federal common law has expanded the notion of insider trading, however, to include 
“outsider trading.”  Outsider trading occurs when a corporate insider learns that his firm 
(or a related firm) will do something that affects the value of another corporation’s stock 
and trades using this information.
143 Thus, insider trading emphasizes the American 
notion of disclosure by imposing on corporate insiders the duty to “abstain or 
disclose.”
144  As part of this duty to “abstain or disclose,” a corporate insider who 
possesses confidential information must either abstain from trading or disclose the 
information to the investing public.  Failure to adhere to federal insider trading rules 
subjects the trader to liability under the Securities and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5.   
Indeed, the American emphasis on transparency and disclosure has been reaffirmed in 
light of the corporate accounting scandals of 2002 and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation, whose implications for corporate governance has yet to be determined.  
2.   The German Model 
The corporate governance model in Germany emanated from very different roots 
than the U.S. model.  German corporate law, as originally enacted in 1935, did not even 
mention the shareholder as a constituency to be served by the corporation.  Instead, it 
provided that “[t]he managing board is, on its own responsibility, to manage the 
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corporation for the good of the enterprise and its retinue (Gefolgschaft), the common 
weal of the folk (Volk) and realm demand (Reich).”
145  It was not until 1965 that 
shareholders were mentioned.
146  In contrast to the United States, shareholders are only 
one of many constituencies served by the German corporate form.   
Unlike the U.S, model, one constituency that appears to have some prominence in 
the German corporate governance model is the employee.  Firms with more than 500 
employees are required to utilize a two-tier board structure, with a supervisory board 
providing oversight and general corporate strategy and a management board providing 
more of a day-to-day management oversight function.
147  If the firm has more than 
2,000 employees, 50% of the supervisory board must consist of employee 
representatives.
148  The remaining 50% consists of shareholder representatives.
149  The 
management board consists almost entirely of the senior management of the 
company.
150  Board members tend to possess technical skills related to the product, in 
addition to considerable firm- and industry-specific knowledge.  This is because careers 
are often built up from the ground level and are focused on building asset-specific skills 
through extensive apprenticeship systems.  The result of the two-tiered board structure 
is explicit representation of stakeholder interest other than interests of shareholders -- 
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no major decisions are made without the input employee representatives.
151  This is in 
stark contrast to the structure of corporate boards in the United States where the board 
structure is single-tier and labor has no right of representation.  In fact, board members 
in the U.S. are required to act in the best interest of the corporation and its shareholder 
and may not specifically represent any particular constituency. 
Banks play a larger role in German corporate governance than they do in the 
United States.  Approximately fourteen percent of corporate shares are owned by 
banks.
152  More importantly, a substantial portion of equity is in the form of bearer, 
rather than registered stock,
153 and these shares are left on deposit with the Hausbank of 
the corporation, which handles dividend payments and record keeping.
154  German law 
allows banks to vote such equity on proxy, unless depositors explicitly instruct banks to 
do otherwise.
155  It appears inertia “work[s] in favor of banks having proxy votes.”
156  
The power banks hold in German corporations is compounded by the fact that many 
company charters include a provision disallowing non-bank shareholders to exercise 
more than five to ten percent of the total votes, regardless of the proportion of shares 
they own.
157 
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The role of the bank in German corporate governance is also strengthened by 
financing patterns.  German companies, taken as a whole, are more leveraged than their 
American counterparts.
158  Moreover, instead of relying on public debt financing, 
German companies finance their debt through bank or intermediated loans.
159  Bank 
financing of long term debt has averaged around 50%, and this percentage has 
remained fairly stable throughout the past two decades.
160 
Creditor interests are also protected through corporate governance regimes.
161  
Dividend payout rules are designed to protect creditor interests.
162  German law 
stipulates that dividends may not be paid out from paid-in capital, even if such paid-in 
capital includes a premium over the face value of equity.
163  This provision makes it 
difficult for German corporations to undertake share repurchases,
164 and consequently, 
also makes it difficult for German shareholders to cash out of the corporation.
 165   
The incorporation of other stakeholder interests in corporate decision-making 
affects governance issues like management compensation.  Unlike in the United States, 
the compensation of German board members must be approved by the shareholders, 
and this approval affects the amount and structure of compensation.  In 1997, CEOs of 
listed German companies earned about half of what their American counterparts 
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earned,
166 and their compensation usually takes the form of fixed salaries and 
bonuses.
167  Providing stocks or stock options as part of top-management’s 
compensation packages is still fairly rare.
168     
Although corporate governance in Germany explicitly takes into account 
stakeholder interests other than shareholders, compared to U.S. firms, the quality of 
disclosure in German firms is poor.
169  The legal and regulatory framework for 
disclosure is considered relatively lax, compared to that in the United States.
170  An 
OECD survey of disclosure quality states that, as of 1989, none of the German firms in 
their sample had complied fully with OECD disclosure guidelines.
171  Similarly, until 
recently, Germany had no insider-trading laws; if insider trading was discovered, the 
penalty was simply to turn over the profits.
172 
3.  Japanese Model 
The traditional corporate governance model in Japan has, like the German model, 
emphasized protection of employee interests, as well as creditor interests.  There has 
been little incentive to be concerned with shareholder value, per se.  This may be due in 
large part to Japan’s corporate ownership structure.  Historically, firms in Japan have 
been networked in the form of keiretsus, groups of firms that own reciprocal, minority 
interests in each other.
173  Although the firms in a keiretsus are usually independent, 
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they to have relational and implicit contracts with each other on matters such as 
ownership, governance, and commercial contracts.
174   
Like Germany, banks also play a significant role in Japanese corporate 
governance structures.  For example, a large main bank that conducts business with all 
of the member firms and holds minority equity positions in each will be a member of a 
horizontal keiretsu.  Although a single bank is not allowed to hold more than 5% of a 
single firm’s stock, a group of four or five banks typically may control between 20-25% 
of the company’s stock.
175   More importantly, the corporation’s largest bank 
shareholder is often the largest creditor.  Thus, the interest of the shareholder is in effect 
the same as the interest of the creditor.  Banks, as creditors and shareholders, are more 
concerned about credit risk than return on the stock investment, and thus are more 
interested in long-term growth than short-term profits.  Thus, the interest of the 
“shareholder” is in fact aligned with the interest of the “creditor.”  This proportion has 
remained fairly stable over the past fifteen years, and these closely held shares rarely, if 
ever, make it into the financial marketplace.
176  Japanese corporations are also typically 
more leveraged than corporations in the United States.  The largest bank shareholder 
also is usually the largest debtholder in the company.
177   
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Quite apart from the lending and the direct intervention roles they play, banks also 
may facilitate the governance process.  They are likely to have a great deal of access to 
inside information and hence can perform a monitoring role very effectively.
178  Given 
the governance role of the banks, resolution of financial distress is a much more 
informal process as compared to the United States.  This is also true in Germany. 
In addition to protection of creditor interests, Japanese corporate governance is 
also concerned with employee interests.  Japan has also been historically known for the 
practice of “lifetime employment.”
179  Employees have remained at their firms due to 
the grant of responsibility and benefits this has provided.
180  The early retirement age in 
Japan, at 55, may also contribute to this practice of “lifetime employment.”
181 
The structure of boards in Japan is similar to that in the Anglo-American system 
with single-tier boards.
182  However, in terms of membership, the Japanese board is 
similar to the German board.  A substantial majority of board members consist of 
current or former senior and middle management of the company.
183   Fukao notes that 
nearly 78% of Japanese directors are promoted from among employees.
184  Thus, unlike 
in the United States, outside directorships are rare.  The one exception to outside 
directorships is the main banks.  Their representatives usually sit on the boards of the 
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keiretsu firms with whom they do business.
185  However, unlike in Germany where 
employees and sometimes suppliers tend to have explicit board representation, the 
interest of stakeholders other than management or banks are not directly represented on 
Japanese boards.
186  
Unlike in Germany, management compensation is not a matter for shareholder 
approval.  Compensation, including that of top management, relies on salaries and 
bonuses.
187  Stocks or stock options are rarely used as a basis for remuneration.  Total 
compensation of top managers, including bonuses, is about six to eight times the 
compensation of the most highly paid blue-collar worker and about seventeen times 
that of the average worker.
188  A managerial labor market along U.S. lines, especially 
for mid-career workers, is thin.
189 
Share ownership in Japan is concentrated and stable. Individual share ownership 
in Japan, like in Germany, has steadily declined from about fifty percent in the 1950s to 
about twenty percent at present.  Thus, in a typical Japanese firm, approximately two-
thirds of the equity is owned by banks, insurance companies, and other corporations.
190  
  Internal management styles and control systems in Japanese firms rely on 
building long-term, consensus-based relationships and are characterized by a great deal 
of informal interactions, personal relations, and information-sharing among relatively 
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culturally homogeneous individuals.
191 There is an apparent reliance on trust, 
reputation-building, and face-saving considerations as the basis for contracting,
192 in 
part because the corporation is seen by its employees as much as a social entity as an 
economic entity.
193  Companies thus rely on face-to-face contacts to resolve issues.
194  
Japanese firms in the larger, organized sector of the economy emphasize lifetime 
employment and building human capital by maximizing asset-specific and relation-
specific skills.  Lateral inter-functional transfers of managers and horizontal 
information flows among functions and departments, both within the firm and across 
firms within the network, are common.
195  Upward mobility within Japanese 
organizations is carried out through a process of moving up through a cross-functional 
spiral rather than through a series of promotions within a particular functional area. 
196  
Disclosure quality, although considered superior to that of German companies, is 
poor relative to that of U.S. firms.  Although there are rules against insider trading and 
monopolistic practices, the application of these laws is, at best, uneven and 
inconsistent.
197  
B.  Corporate Governance Regimes and Sustainable Peace   
1.  A Comparative Assessment 
  It is important to remember that the corporate governance models of the United 
States, Germany, and Japan are rooted in democratic political entities.  Or to frame this in 
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Bobbitt’s terms, the Entrepreneurial, Managerial, and Mercantile Models are embedded 
in parliamentary democracies.
198  The question becomes to what extent to the 
descriptions of the varying regimes raise the concerns expressed by Barber that 
corporations themselves tend to undermine the very democratic virtues that lead to 
sustainable peace.
199  To analyze these issues, we compare these alternatives on the basis 
of:  (1) the corporation’s sense of citizenship; and (2) the extent to which corporations 
equip citizens with voice in the affairs that affect them.  In doing so, a model emerges 
that suggests that corporations of each parliamentary democracy might wish to consider: 
(1) the creation of authentic communities that encourage peace rather than a solipsistic 
notion of community; and (2) the opportunities and dangers in extended beneficial 
attributes of voice and citizenship to groups not typically accorded those attributes as 
well as how these extensions can best be accomplished.  After sketching these cross-
cutting notions, we propose four contributions corporations can make to sustainable 
peace, not in the sense of a universal model for corporate governance, but as a set of 
criteria that corporate regimes might generally aim toward, within the context of their 
own cultural histories and realities. 
a.  Citizenship and Voice 
i. Citizenship 
For several years, corporate governance scholarship has focused on a debate 
between contractarian and communitarian approaches.
200  In an important sense, this 
debate is related to Barber’s concern as to whether corporations create a McWorld that 
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undermines democratic values by undermining a sense of citizenship.
201  In a 
contractarian  paradigm, which underscores the U.S. version of the Entrepreneurial 
model, notions of citizenship are likely to revolve around legally enforceable duties, such 
as obeying laws generally and, more particularly, those laws that protect investors 
through fiduciary duty, securities, and other regulation.
202   Thus, according to Bobbitt 
and Barber, the notion of citizenship in this model is thinner than in other models.  Yet, 
for example, the U.S. variant on this model has been flexible enough to accommodate 
various notions of citizenship, as evidenced by adoption of statutes in a majority of states 
that explicitly permit management to consider the interests of constituencies other than 
shareholders when making decisions. 
The notions of citizenship may be more pronounced in the German (Managerial) 
and Japanese (Mercantile) model, however.
203  In both models, there is an expectation of 
corporations serving a societal good.  In Germany, this is explicit in a stakeholder model 
that directs the company to be concerned with society generally as well as employees and 
creditors.
204  In Japan, this is tied to cultural notions of solidarity and employee 
enmeshment with work.
205  In both cases, there is a clear understanding that corporations 
are part of a greater social fabric and duties attending to the maintenance of that fabric.  It 
would seem that the introduction of a commitment to a public good, such as sustainable 
peace (provided that sufficient empirical support is established to make plausible the case 
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that corporations can, in fact, have an impact on social stability), could be incorporated 
into these models. 
ii. Voice 
  As important as the societal purposes of corporations is the extent to which the 
key democratic virtue of voice is fostered varies according to each model.  Although 
citizenship notions seem to be more akin to Germany and Japanese models, the U.S. 
model may have greater sensitivity to voice.  As we have seen, the U.S. model 
emphasizes transparency and disclosure.
206  Both equip a recipient with the capability to 
exercise voice.  This voice is particularly important insofar as investors are concerned, 
but disclosure and transparency have other significant beneficial effects with respect to 
sustainable peace as demonstrated below.
207  They give other stakeholders information by 
which they can more powerfully exercise their own voice, even if it is simply in criticism 
of the corporation itself.  The 2002 corporate scandals demonstrate that the 
Entrepreneurial Model is not perfect in its accurate disclosure of information.  The 
scandals demonstrate the need for even better transparency and disclosure and they also 
demonstrate another powerful constituent voice: that of management itself.   
  Management’s voice is also heard strongly in the Mercantile and Managerial 
Models.  In the Mercantile Model, the strong voice of management, together with that of 
other corporate leadership represented through cross-ownership mediated through 
creditors dominates corporate affairs.
208   Similarly, the Managerial Model also 
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emphasizes the voice of creditors and senior management.
209  In addition, however, the 
Managerial Model features the institutionally empowered voice of employees through 
board representation and society in general.
210  Yet, given the diminished degree of 
transparency and disclosure in both models, the capability of dissent is minimized.  Only 
a few individuals have access to the information necessary to exercise voice 
meaningfully.  Thus, although the Managerial and Mercantile Models are both more 
communitarian and thus theoretically more conducive to a goal of peaceful stability, they 
lack a central attribute essential to stability.   
b.  Mediating Institutions and Lessons to Counteract Cynicism 
i.  Mediating Institutions 
In previous work, we argued for a blended model of corporate governance.
211 This 
model featured enhanced notions of transparency and disclosure for German and 
Japanese regimes and a greater sense of community for the U.S. system.
212  Yet a 
common problem for each of the regimes, regardless of whether they were more 
communitarian or more contractarian, was the potential diminishment of the individual in 
a large society.  Indeed, we began our article with a comment by Vaclev Havel, where he 
notes that both capitalist corporations and socialist plants shared the common problem of 
being so large so as to dwarf the individual working for it.
213  This can be true of a large 
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U.S. company, but it can also be true of an organization that is devoted to the entire 
nation-state of Germany or Japan.
214 
  In opposition to the model of a corporation as a megastructure, we proposed the 
model of business as a mediating institution, where are small enough so that individuals 
interact with others in their organization on an interpersonal basis, experience the 
consequences of their actions, and develop their moral identity.
215  This is not to suggest 
that corporations be limited in size, but it is to suggest that corporations consciously 
attempt to structure themselves to have communities within their overall corporate 
structure.
216  Such a model could preserve and even enhance an authentic community 
identity of the corporation while at the same time also require the kind of transparency 
and disclosure that supports voice.
217  Moreover, as discussed below, anthropologists 
have found that the traits of mediating institutions – relatively small, face-to-face 
interactions, reduced hierarchy and consensual decision-making – are all attribute of 
peaceful societies.
218  Thus, a model of communities within corporations is a potential 
model for peaceful societies as well as scheme that addresses a problem of corporate 
megastructure size that is common to companies in each regime. 
ii.  Lessons to Counteract Cynicism 
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In a later article in this volume, Professor Dana Muir discusses the history of 
employee benefit programs as related to issues surrounding peace.
219 Muir notes that 
employee benefit programs have been championed as a way to mitigate some of the 
harshness of capitalism so that employees believed that they were, in fact, participants in 
the system as opposed to be exploited by the system.
220  Muir traces this hope in the 
United States and in other countries and suggests that such programs offer some degree 
of participation that fosters harmony over competition.
221  Yet, she also warns, that 
superficial programs, those that promise employee involvement, participation, and voice, 
but do not deliver, can sew the seeds of cynicism.
222  This potential problem exists, for 
instance, in employee programs where putative employee stock owners do not have the 
right to vote the stock they own unlike other shareholders.
223 
  Professor Muir’s warnings are apt for any extension of “benefits” to a group not 
traditionally having them.  Whether Japanese, German, or American, the extension of a 
right to those who otherwise have not had it, may engender as much suspicion as 
gratitude.  Thus, if the promise of voice, participation, ownership, transparency, 
disclosure or other attributes that appear to be beneficial to harmonious relationships is 
not fulfilled, there is a risk of increasing cynicism and distrust.  At the same time, Muir’s 
analysis shows that there are models for such extensions that could prove to be beneficial 
to connecting business and peace. 
c.  Concluding Thoughts:  Comparative Assessment  
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From the foregoing analysis, it does not appear that there is anything inherently 
problematic about connecting corporate governance and sustainable peace.  In each 
country, there is openness to values in addition to profitability for shareholders.  
Although maximizing shareholder value is clearly an important, overriding goal for a 
corporation and for the nation states establishing the legal governance rules for the 
society, Anglo-American law allows for consideration of non-shareholder constituents, 
Japanese law provides room for concern for the social aspect of work, and German law is 
concerned for employee and social welfare in business management.    Although questing 
for sustainable peace may sound idealistic, it is also a goal that benefits corporations 
themselves, if they are able to contribute to societies that tend to be more stable in the 
long run and more peaceful.  Thus, there is a plausible long-term reason for why 
businesses have an interest in sustainable peace and an openness within corporate 
governance regimes to pursue it as a goal.  To be sure, it would be even more conducive 
to making this goal a widely endorsed corporate goal, if extant governance regimes were 
to specify its legitimacy.  Yet, even without legal change, corporations can adapt current 
practices in order to integrate the goal of sustainable peace into a transnational corporate 
goal.  
  This quest will require some adaptations of corporate governance, but in a world 
where access to powerful technologies of violence is relatively easy, it becomes 
incumbent on corporations (as well as other citizens) to consider what contributions they 
might be able to make to a world that, for reasons of survival itself, evolves.  With this in 
mind, we propose four ways in which corporations might be able to contribute to 
sustainable peace.  This proposal is not made in definitive terms.  It is not presented a William Davidson Institute Working Paper 532 
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proven mechanism for achieving sustainable peace.  Instead, our ambition is to sketch a 
plausible way for corporations to contribute to sustainable peace   corresponding with 
existing evidence.   
2.  A Proposed Model of Corporate Action 
As we have suggested in this article and developed more fully in previous work, 
there is a plausible, conceptual relationship among the role of business, business ethics 
and sustainable peace.
224  The gist of this argument is that through economic progress 
and mitigation of rivalries in the workplace, multinational corporations can contribute 
to sustainable peace.  Business can do this by: 
(1) fostering economic development, particularly for the marginalized; 
(2) adopting external evaluation principles, such as transparency and 
supporting a legal system that enforces those principles, i.e,. a “rule of  
law;”  
(3) nourishing a sense of community both within the company and in the 
areas in which the company is located; and 
(4) mediating potentially conflicting parties and redirecting those parties 
toward a common goal, even if that goal is only that of profitability. 
 
We wish to sketch this model conceptually and illustrate the themes by the actions of 
specific companies.  In doing so, we are not suggesting that these attributes be 
uncritically accepted as a model for peaceful corporate governance.  There is, however, 
evidence to show connections between the characteristics and sustainable peace and 
suggest that corporate governance regimes, attentive to the comparative concerns 
already raised, can integrate these characteristics in culturally appropriate ways. 
a.  Fostering Economic Development 
  The first thing companies can do to help work toward the goal of peace is what 
they do best: foster economic development.  A recent United Nations report showed a William Davidson Institute Working Paper 532 
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highly positive correlation between underdevelopment and violence.   Intuitively, this 
correlation makes sense: in an environment of extremely scarce resources, competition 
for the necessities of life could lead to conflict that could turn violent.  Although critics 
of globalization often downplay the economic advantages corporations bring with them 
to country, there are a number of ways in which corporations contribute to more stable 
societies.   
  The first contribution corporations make toward stability is in providing jobs to 
residents of the country.  For instance, Frigorifico Canelones, a division of Land 
O’Frost and recognized by the U.S. Secretary of State as a winner of the Award for 
Corporate Excellence,
225 turned a bankrupt meat processing plant into a profitable 
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225 The criteria for the Secretary of State’s Award for Corporate Excellence are: 
•  Maintaining good corporate citizenship by engaging in ethical business practices, 
maintaining the integrity of the company, and dealing with consumers in 
accordance with fair business practices.  
•  Displaying exemplary employment practices and a fair opportunity for trade 
unions to represent employees as well as avoiding discrimination based on race, 
gender or ethnicity.  
•  Creating a healthy workplace environment for all workers. This includes working 
for the effective abolition of child labor and forced labor practices as well as 
maintaining a working environment equal to, if not exceeding, comparable local 
industry standards of health and safety.  
•  Conducting business with an astute consciousness of local, national, and global 
environmental concerns. This includes the collection and ongoing monitoring of 
useful information regarding the environmental, health, and social impacts of 
operations. Also, working with local, national, and international officials to 
adequately communicate to the public regarding potential environmental and 
health issues without compromising the business's integrity and ability to operate 
successfully.  
•  Contributing to the overall growth and development both economically and 
socially of the local society. This includes work-specific skills training, general 
academic improvement, and opportunities for personal self-improvement, as well 
as other programs, services and philanthropic endeavors for the local public, all 
aimed at providing a base for growing and sustaining an increased quality of life.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 532 
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Uruguayan operation.
226  The resulting 800 jobs, in a town with no other major 
employer, provided economic development to an impoverished area.
227  The same kind 
of experiences holds true in Malaysia, where Motorola, also an Award winner, invested 
$1.1 billion and employed more than 8,000 people, as well as in Ethiopia, through the 
work of F.C. Schaffer & Associates, a small Louisiana sugar company employing 7,000 
people.
228     
    The second corporate contribution results from the benefits they can provide to 
the local population.  For example, Frigorifico Canelones supports training and 
educational programs for homeless and abused youth as well as recreational programs 
for children.
229   Ford Motor Co., also a winner of the Award for Corporate Excellence, 
sponsors AIDS-related programs in Africa, working with local health care 
authorities.
230   Xerox, which won an Award in 1999, not only contributes to programs 
for children, but also addresses another stakeholder group – employees – by providing 
counseling programs designed to help lift people out of poverty in Brazil.
231   In 
addition, it offers space in its facilities for local cultural activities.
232 
                                                                                                                                                 
•  Endeavoring to ensure that business activities are compatible with the science and 
technology policies of the countries and, as appropriate, contribute to the 
development of local innovative capacity.  
•  Developing and maintaining a healthy respect for the local, national, and 
international authority. This includes rejecting the practices of bribery, extortion, 
illegal tax exemption, and favoritism in favor of creating a fair and open 
marketplace beneficial to all. http://www.state.gov/search.htm. 
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    The third contribution relates to resource transfer.  This transfer could be in 
technological development or development of human managerial capabilities, or both.  
Motorola’s work in Malaysia exemplifies both features of this dimension.  By building 
a high-tech manufacturing plant, it provides technological know-how to the Malay 
people,
233 which itself provides a foundation for additional economic development.  
Moreover, the managers of Motorola’s facilities are not ex-patriots, but citizens of 
Malaysia,
234 thereby transferring managerial skills are transferred to the country as 
well.    F.C. Schaffer & Associates also exhibits these characteristics with a bit of a 
novel twist.  After devastating floods racked Ethiopia, the company shared its expertise 
in running sugar refineries with competitors.
235  It continues to provide consulting 
services for the design of co-generation, environmentally safe power plants.
236   
  A fourth contribution is the simple task of paying taxes.  The benefit to society 
provided by tax revenues, however, is dependent on the quality of the government 
collecting the taxes and the use made of them.  Assuming just governmental regimes, 
tax revenues may be quite beneficial in helping to provide a much needed 
infrastructure. 
  If a key factor in violence is the desperation produced by marginalization, then the 
work of companies such as these avoids exploitation.  These companies have built local 
capacities while also being profitable.   Ethics scholar, Michael Santoro, has argued that 
there is a difference between companies that exploit low-wage economies by creating 
sweatshops as a cost-minimization strategy and others that adopt a market-building 
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strategy.
237  The first is more likely to sow the seeds of resentment.  The second is a 
contribution to the welfare of the countries in which companies do their work.  
b.  Adopting External Evaluation Principles 
 With  modern  communications  technology,  it is difficult for any company to be 
immune from the potential glare of publicity and investigative reporting.  Yet some 
companies welcome transparency.  To be transparent is to be willing to have your 
actions evaluated by others.  Although not all transparency is universally good – there 
are, after all balances that need to be struck between transparency and privacy – 
accountability to external standards may contribute to a social environment where 
violence is less likely to occur.  Two aspects of transparency are particularly worth 
noting: transparency with respect to corruption and support of a rule of law. 
  In previous research, we conducted an analysis of whether there is a connection 
between corruption and violence.
238  We compared the ranking of countries by 
Transparency International in its Corruption Perception Index with the Heidelberg 
Institute for International Conflict Research’s index related to conflict around the 
world.
239 The Corruption Perception Index is based on interviews with approximately 
770 managers and other business people about the extent to which corruption is 
endemic in a country in which they work.
240 The Heidelberg Institute keeps track of 
conflicts that occur within a country and evaluates them according to whether they are 
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handled in a nonviolent or violent way.
241  The assessment tracks twenty-eight different 
attributes, and also provides a four-part characterization of whether disputes are 
handled mostly violently, somewhat violently, somewhat nonviolently, and mostly 
nonviolently.
242   
    The results were striking.  Countries in the top quartile of the TI index, that is, 
those countries that were the least corrupt, resolved disputes by violence 14% of the 
time.
243  Those in the second quartile resolved disputes by violence 26% of the time.
244  
The third quartile resolved disputes by violence 44% of the time and those in the 
bottom TI quartile, that is the most corrupt, resolved disputes by violence 60% of the 
time.
245   These findings are correlative, not causative.  Yet, it is possible that poverty 
may contribute to corruption which leads to violence.  If so, then underdevelopment 
may be more of a root cause to violence that corruption per se.  Nevertheless, it is hard 
to see how more corruption will help a social situation.   
    John Noonan, an expert in the study of bribery, once noted that bribery is 
typically hidden unless the leaders are so brazen and secure in their power that they can 
flaunt their corruption.
246  That which is hidden, by tautology, is not subject to external 
evaluation.  In fact, the goal of the efforts of TI is to publicize incidents of corruption.  
Keeping corruption hidden denies the opportunity to raise meaningful objections to the 
practice.  As ethicists Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee have argued, keeping 
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bribery hidden skews the efficient distribution of resources because decisions are not 
made on the basis of a merit that can be publicly evaluated and justified, but on the 
basis of a kind of power that is immune from evaluation.
247  Corruption stifles the voice 
of people evaluating the action. 
    No one company is going to solve a country’s corruption problems.  Yet, 
companies can try to limit the corruption endemic to a country and also work to try to 
change the enforcement of laws so that anti-bribery laws are effective.  Indeed, this is 
the recommendation of the OECD in order to promote efficient markets.
248  Moreover, 
if there is also a correlation between corruption and violence, then the cause of peace 
could be beneficially supported by corporate efforts to limit or eliminate corruption. 
    This commitment to support laws that reduce or eliminate bribery lead to the 
second kind of evaluative commitment: support of the rule of law itself.  One of the 
clear lessons from the emerging economies of central and Eastern Europe after 1989 is 
that those countries that quickly established a commitment to a rule of law, particularly 
in terms of contract and property protection, flourished more than others.  Even the free 
market is not completely free – it requires a legal and moral infrastructure to work.  
This has been acknowledged by devout free marketers such as F.A.
249 and Milton 
Friedman.
250   Perhaps even more interestingly, economist Jane Jacobs has argued that 
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those countries with strong commercial values, including values of promise-keeping in 
contracts, respect for property, and nonviolent, negotiated resolution of disputes, tend to 
be more peaceful.
251   
  There are at least three ways in which companies can support a rule of law.  First, 
they can comply with legal requirements.
252    Unfortunately, not all laws are just.  
Nevertheless, compliance with most legal requirements typically yields good results.  
Second, they can educate people about laws are and how they can be useful.  Johnson 
& Johnson currently operates a program in rural China in conjunction with the Chinese 
government and UNICEF that teaches healthcare workers about regulations pertaining 
to childbirth.  This is done with the hope of increasing the knowledge of midwives and 
other healthcare providers to improve the quality of medical services.  Thus, by 
teaching people about law, living conditions can by improved. 
    A third way is more controversial.  Hernando de Soto has made a provocative 
argument claiming that nearly $1.3 trillion lay in the hands of the very poor around the 
world.
253  The problem is that the poor are unable to access those resources because the 
most valuable assets are their homes and the legal title requirements in emerging 
countries often do not allow the marginalized to acquire clear title to their homes.  
Without title, the poor cannot exercise the most basic of entrepreneurial strategies of 
taking out a home loan to start a business.  As a result, there is enormous potential that 
could be unleashed if certain kinds of property systems – akin to the Homestead Act in 
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the United States in the early part of its history
254 – are developed.  Clearly, this is a 
legal reform dependent upon governmental action, but corporations have influence, 
often significant influence in law reform.  De Soto’s point is that such reforms would 
improve the plight of the marginalized, which itself would be contribution to stability, 
and also provide more economic opportunity as the creative potential of the poor is 
unleashed.  The market is not a zero-sum game, but one that grows with increased 
economic activity. 
      c.  Nourishing a Sense of Community 
  The neorealist school of foreign policy argues that people are concerned with 
filling their needs, including their psychological needs of security and identity.
255  The 
post-Cold War era has made this point painfully on numerous occasions.  According to 
one study, more than 90% of post Cold War conflicts have occurred within the borders 
of an existing nation-state and the battles have been on the basis of ethnic, cultural, and 
religious identity.
256   Religious historian Scott Appleby has analyzed fundamentalist 
religious movements in all faiths and argues that it is when a group feels threatened, i.e. 
their security in their identity is at risk, extremism can take hold.
257  Extremism is not 
necessarily violent, but it can be.   
  In a rare cross-cultural study of attributes of peaceful societies, anthropologist 
David Fabbro notes that those societies that are relatively small, have a great deal of 
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face-to-face interaction, allow for most, if not all, community members to participate in 
decisions, are relatively egalitarian (including gender equity), practice nonviolent 
resolution of conflicts, and are geographically separated from others tend to be more 
peaceful.
258  There is not much a company can do to influence geographical separation, 
but there are things companies can do to mirror the attributes of peaceful societies. 
  First, businesses can become genuine communities.  More specifically, companies 
can become mediating institutions.  As Timothy Fort has argued, there are both moral 
and neurobiological reasons for why human beings develop their values in relative 
small groups – mediating institutions – such as family, neighborhood, religious groups, 
and voluntary associations.
259  Large bureaucratic companies do not necessarily lend 
themselves to being communities, but creating a sense of connectedness among 
members of an organization can provide a sense of security and identity to the people 
who work there. 
  As part of this process, the second thing companies can do is to encourage the use 
of “voice” by those in the company.  Having a voice in the promulgation of rules is a 
critical, identifying characteristic of a democracy.   Although subtle, we suggest that 
when a company committed to quality processes, such as Motorola, insists that its 
employees speak up when they recognize a product defect, these employees have 
learned something about participatory governance, and this knowledge may spillover 
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into the country itself.   This could be significant because, as noted above,
260 
democratic countries rarely, if ever, go to war with each other.    
  Finally, a corporation can contribute to the psychological security and identity of 
a country by investing in the people of that country.  Earlier, the Motorola example of 
having its Malay plant run by Malay managers was noted.  To the extent companies can 
develop and empower leaders in the countries where their plants are located, the less 
likely, it would seem, that those plants would be seen as threatening of local culture.  
This is an area which merits considerably more research. 
   d.  Mediating Between Potentially Conflicting Parties 
     Nation states clearly compete for power.  We suggest that corporations can play a 
role in mediating some of the contests for power between people for whom either 
power or security is at stake through what has become known as “track two” 
diplomacy.  This can happen in three ways. 
    In general, governmental leaders are typically limited in the people they can talk 
with in other countries.  By diplomatic protocol, they can only talk to other 
governmental officials.  Not only does this limit the number of available conversation 
partners, it limits the flexibility of negotiations between leaders of countries in the 
midst of a dispute.  Utilizing track two diplomacy, an outside party can relay unofficial 
messages.  For instance, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman notes that the 
2002 nuclear showdown between India and Pakistan was mitigated, at least in part, by 
the actions of General Electric executives impressing on the Indian government the 
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need to come to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
261  Businesses, in short, can play a 
role.  Governments interested in expanding power may still bluster at each other, but 
businesspeople have a perspective of the security and stability that is in play for a 
variety of participants that needs to be factored into political equations.  This is not to 
suggest that businesspeople become spies for their own governments.  Instead, it is for 
them to provide ways for power-interested politicians to settle disputes with a minimum 
of social disruption. 
    A second kind of track two diplomacy is that of corporate citizenship. Businesses 
can be ambassadors for their countries.  In doing so, a more positive vision of the 
country may emerge.  There is a huge literature on the actions corporations can take in 
order to be constructive citizens in their communities.  These actions range from 
environmental responsibility to respect for human rights to promoting educational 
opportunities for employees and others beside.  We simply suggest that within this vast 
corporate citizenship literature lies a large number of potential sources of examples for 
constructive corporate involvement.
262 
A third kind of track two diplomacy might occur in the workplace.  A corporation 
provides the opportunity for different people,  perhaps even ethnically conflicting,  to 
work together for a common goal.  Sometimes this is explicit; other times it is not.  For 
instance, Futureways, a company in Ireland, purposely hires both Protestants and 
Catholics, in an approximate 50-50 ratio, for its workforce.
263  Not only do these often-
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warring populations work together for the goal of a profitable company, they also talk 
about their experiences with each other.  A nonbusiness example of the same 
philosophy – Seeds of Peace – brings together Israeli and Palestinian youths to a 
summer camp in New England each year in order to demonstrate that “the enemy has a 
face.”
264  People typically walk away from the experience with the “outgroup member” 
as being a person rather than an enemy.
265  A less explicit example of this would be a 
company that simply brings together people from different groups to work together 
without necessarily promoting explicit discussion of their differences.
266    
Our argument is not that business should take on some kind of messianic purpose.  
Businesses have a primary role in terms of providing economic growth and opportunity.  
But businesses can choose to pursue that growth in different ways.  This research 
suggests that business can pursue its work in ways that might contribute to more 
stability, more security, and more peace in societies.   
IV.  Conclusion 
Issues of globalization have been present for many years.  Corporate power has 
been increasing for decades if not centuries.  Communication technologies allow for 
relative ease in crossing the borders of sovereign nation states thereby reducing the 
power of traditional forms of government.  Environmental degradation defies neat 
compartmentalization within geographic boundaries.  Nation states are still critically 
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important organizations, but markets and technologies mark the new millennium as 
presenting a different set of challenges than what has previously existed. 
In a changing environment, those who survive are those who adapt.  This is a time 
where adaptation is necessary.  More specifically, those organizations that have the 
capability to cross borders, move markets, connect individuals and cultures, and bring 
people to work together have the potential to create either great harm and anguish or 
great gains.  Among these organizations are transnational governmental bodies, such as 
the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and many others as well as 
nongovernmental organizations such as the Red Cross or Transparency International.  
Yet at the center of the changes impacting the world is the multinational corporation.   
In this paper, we have not argued that corporations necessarily have a duty to 
adapt their policies in order to integrate a quest for sustainable peace among their other 
financial objectives.  Instead, we have suggested that given the changing world and the 
potential negative impact corporations may have on democracy, it is worth pausing to 
consider what corporations might be able to do.  By incorporating sustainable peace as 
a business objective, multinational corporations may be able to blend extant corporate 
governance principles with a goal that can significantly contribute to the reduction of 
violence in the world.   
The arguments are, at best, nascent in form.  There is considerable amount of 
research that needs to be conducted and refinement of the ideas we have articulated.  In 
particular, there is a need for academic scholars as well as members of 
nongovernmental organizations to more fully explore the extent to which corporate 
actions have an impact on violence and stability.  The reason for this need is not to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 532 
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attempt to find blame, but rather to sketch out the relationship is between corporate 
action and sustainable peace.  We would expect that such research will demonstrate an 
indirect connection.  That is, that certain kinds of societies are more prone to violence 
(and stability) and that corporations contribute to the development of such societies in 
certain ways.   
If this connection can be made, businesses may have a model of how they can act.  
And, in fact, there are models of good corporate citizenship that are already being 
linked to sustainable peace.  These examples are likely to become important 
touchstones for other businesses to emulate and to provide the freedom for businesses 
to think more largely about they might be able to do. 
Finally, if there are connections between types of economic productivity and 
sustainable peace, there may be pressure on governments to create incentives for 
corporations to contribute to stability by modifying existing governance laws.   In the 
meantime, enough evidence exists to sketch some things companies can do to 
contribute to peace.  That is, they can foster economic development, remain open to 
external evaluation of corporate actions, act as good corporate citizens in the 
community and to be a corporate community in its own right, and take advantage of 
opportunities for track two diplomacy. 
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